Was the agent inside or outside scope?
A 5-step walkthrough of how an AI-agent insurance claim is reviewed using GeoClear evidence artifacts. The cryptography is real (digital signature, computed in your browser); the keys are demo-ephemeral. Click through each step at your own pace — about 7 minutes end to end.
Agent Scope Certificate
An enterprise binds insurance coverage on its customer-support agent. The Agent Scope Certificate captures what the agent is authorized to do, against the agent operating policy version active at bind. The insurer underwrites against this machine-checkable scope.
Canonical payload
Runtime Decision Receipt
A customer asks for a refund and threatens legal action. The agent does three things: promises a $7,500 refund, tells the customer the company accepts liability, and calls the refund API without the required human approval. The Runtime Decision Receipt records what the agent did, against the agent operating policy active at action time.
Canonical payload
Claim Review
The insurer's claims team opens the bundle. They have the Agent Scope Certificate (what the agent was allowed to do) and the Runtime Decision Receipt (what the agent actually did). The question: was this inside or outside authorized scope?
Canonical payload
Tamper test
What stops a reviewer from "fixing" the bundle to make the agent look like it acted inside scope? Try it. Edit the refund amount in the Runtime Decision Receipt below. The receipt was created at action time against the retained evidence. If you change any byte of the evidence, the receipt no longer matches.
Could someone edit the ZIP and re-sign it?
You can always edit a file. Cryptography does not stop editing. It stops undetected editing.
There are three cases:
jwks.json contains only the public half. In the demo, the private key only exists in your browser's memory and is destroyed on page reload. In production, the private key lives in GeoClear's hardware-backed signing infrastructure and never leaves it. Blocked at the cryptography layer. Production closes this gap with an external trust anchor. A production GeoClear receipt is verified against GeoClear's public verification material — not against whatever key appears inside the ZIP. To fake a production receipt, an attacker would need to control the trusted public-key source, not just edit a downloaded bundle.
Claim Evidence Bundle
Everything goes into one portable, customer-held ZIP. The bundle is the artifact that survives vendor changes, disputes, and time — the property a screenshot does not have.
In this browser demo, the bundle verifies against the demo public key included in the ZIP. In production, the verifier checks the receipt against GeoClear's public trust anchor, not just a key bundled with the file. That is what prevents someone from editing the bundle, generating a new key, and pretending the modified version is authentic.
Bundle contents
This demo bundle is signed with an ephemeral keypair generated in your browser at page load. A production GeoClear bundle is signed with the customer-grade signing infrastructure described in the gated security whitepaper. The cryptographic mechanic is identical; the trust anchor differs.
Verify the bundle right here
Skip the download-and-extract. Click Run verifier to watch what an insurer's claims reviewer would see in their terminal — right here, on the page. Click any artifact in the file tree to inspect it. Switch between Demo Mode and Production Mode below to see why a re-signed ZIP cannot fake GeoClear authenticity.
Demo Mode shows how verification works — checks the receipt against the verification material bundled with the ZIP. Good for teaching.
Production Mode shows why authenticity cannot be forged by editing the bundle, replacing the verification material, or re-signing with a new key — the verifier resolves the receipt's origin identifier against GeoClear's external public trust anchor, not the verification material bundled with the receipt.
Browse the bundle
⚠ Tamper any field, then re-run the verifier
Pick any artifact, pick any field, change its value — the terminal pane re-runs verification and shows which artifact fails. The signature itself is unchanged; only the canonical bytes diverge.
🔴 Red-team scenarios · can you forge a V-certified bundle?
Three one-click attacks. Each one applies a different forgery technique, then re-runs the verifier in the current mode. The key takeaway: Demo Mode trusts the verification material bundled with the receipt, so an attacker who re-signs with their own keypair appears valid. Production Mode requires the receipt's origin identifier to resolve against GeoClear's external trust anchor, so no in-bundle forgery can pass.